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ABSTRACT

COLLECTIVE FORGIVENESS AND THE UNFORGIVABLE
By
Robert Woon Chul Fisher
University of New Hampshire, May 2009

Forgiveness is an intricate part of our everyday moral interactions, although it is
fundamentally a difficult concept. Unforgivable crimes are inexcusable, and equally as
difficult a concept, because the unforgivable often references collective crimes. This
paper will provide an analysis of forgiveness, the unforgivable, and how both relate to
collectives by distinguishing the crimes from their perpetrators. At a fundamental level,
individual forgiveness can be expanded to allow for collective forgiveness, despite the
inherent difficulties of such collective forgiveness. Similarly, unforgivable crimes can be
expanded to accommodate collective injuries. To accommodate for the unforgivable, I
distinguished an unforgivable act from an unforgivable offender, and these ideas of
unforgivability can also be expanded to collectives, and indeed such collective injuries
are most often cited as examples of the unforgivable.

v

INTRODUCTION

God has seen two World Wars in this century alone plus the Holocaust, the
genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda, the awfulness in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, the
two Congos, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East, and the excesses that have
characterized Latin American. It is a baneful catalog that records our capacity to
wreak considerable harm on one another and our gross inhumanity to our fellow
humans.
- Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness'

The horrendous crimes cataloged by Desmond Tutu are intuitively beyond the
possibility of forgiveness, because they invoke Kant's notion of "the radical evil of
human nature which ... constitutes the fouls strain of our species - and so long as we do
not remove it, it hinders the germ of the good from developing as it otherwise would."
The conception of radical evil is adopted by Hannah Arendt as "neither punishable nor
forgivable, because punishment and forgiveness presuppose what radical evil eliminates:
that is, human action."3 Jacques Derrida also believes that such massive injustices are
unforgivable: "monstrous crimes ... [are] 'unforgivable."4 However, Derrida's
interpretation of forgiveness is paradoxical, because "if there is something to forgive, it
1

Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 124.

Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. Allen Wood and George di
Giovanni, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 61, Royal Prussian Academy of Science
Pagination 6:38.
3

Richard J Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1996), 149.

Jacques Derrida, "On Forgiveness," from On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (New York: Routledge,
2001), 33.
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would be in religious language is called mortal sin, the worst, the unforgivable crime or
harm.... Forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable."5 Despite the many differences and
disagreements between Arendt's and Derrida's discussions of the unforgivable, both are
underlined by the massive scale of the injustices, not to mention the vagueness with
which the unforgivable is discussed. This paper will address such collective crimes to
determine whether they are unforgivable. I will provide an account of forgiveness that
accommodates the unforgivable for both individuals and collectives by addressing the
relation between the collectives that commit such crimes, the crimes themselves, and
forgiveness. I will argue some crimes cannot be forgiven, and in some instances the
groups that commit such crimes cannot be distinguished from the injuries, thus making
the group unforgivable. However, individuals within collectives that are unforgivable
may be forgiven, even if the collective as a whole cannot, because forgiving the injuries
suffered can be distinguished from forgiving the offenders. I do not presuppose that the
following is a complete account of forgiveness, or the unforgivable. Instead, I am
attempting to demonstrate how forgiveness and the unforgivable can remain consistent
when applied to individuals and collectives.

5

Derrida, "On Forgiveness," 32.

CHAPTER I

FORGIVENESS

It is important to begin with a discussion of what is meant by "forgiveness,"
because our conceptions of forgiveness are muddied by its many uses. For example, we
forgive our peers and ourselves for the minor offenses we commit against each other; we
forgive debts; we forgive the dead, and many of us pray for God's 6 forgiveness.
Forgiveness is further confused by its similarities and relations to our conceptions of
punishment, pardon, and mercy. The different uses of forgiveness are contextually
dependent, and given the variety of the contexts in which forgiveness is appropriate, can
have vastly different meanings. However, all forms of forgiveness are predicated on the
assumption that there was, or at least is perceived to have been, an injury, crime, immoral
act, sin, etc, committed. These notions of wrongdoing are widely varied, and for the sake
of simplicity, will generally be referred to as "injuries" or "offenses." Also, forgiveness
is generally "a certain kind of ethical response to injury and the injurer"7 that is primarily
aimed at the reconciliation between the victim and the offender. By no stretch of the
imagination do I suppose that the following analysis is a completely encompassing and

6

See Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) for a detailed
account of the relationship between forgiveness and Judeo-Christian traditions.
7

Griswold, Forgiveness, 39.
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authoritative account of forgiveness. However, what follows can generally be referred to
as forgiveness at its best, or an ideal interpretation of forgiveness.
The many uses and interpretations of an ideal forgiveness traditionally require the
offender to feel remorseful, and to repent by "approaching the victim to apologize and
ask for forgiveness."8 Continuing in this vein, I will argue the offender's remorse is an
ideal condition for forgiveness, although forgiveness may still be achieved without an
apology. Although apologies can have different meanings and may be offered in many
different forms,9 it is the victim's responsibility to judge the offender's apologetic
sincerity, and the truthfulness of the offender's remorse.10 For our purposes, "to be
appropriately forgiven, the wrongdoer must morally regret the wrong he did to the other,
and feel remorse," ' because this allows for a moral dialog between the parties. I believe
an offender who is not remorseful for the injuries she occasioned is unworthy of
forgiveness, despite the instances where the regret cannot be demonstrated to the
victim, because forgiveness is a moral exchange between the victim and the offender
that is aimed at reconciliation. Forgiveness can be interpreted as a deontological duty if
the offender expresses appropriate remorse for the injuries. Forgiveness also promotes
the end of reconciliation.

Trudy Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," from American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No.
1, (Jan. 1999), pp. 59-75, (University of Illinois Press), 59.
9

See Nick Smith, / Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2008).
10

Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 62.
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Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 63.
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Apologies are not always necessary for forgiveness, such as forgiving the dead. However, I believe
forgiveness is best achieved when the offender acknowledges her guilt and remorse.

4

My account of an ideal forgiveness, and its aim of reconciliation, requires an
apology from the offender, because apologies recognize the moral standing of the
1 -J

victim.

Apologies also allow for the dialog that is necessary for B to forgive A for the

injuries A caused B to suffer. The dialog is important, because it allows for agreement on
the nature of the injuries suffered. An agreement on the injuries is important to
forgiveness, because it would be inappropriate if I forgave you for one perceived injury,
whereas you apologized for another. Apologies allow the offender to accept blame for
causing the injury, and acknowledge the blame to the victim. The moral dialog that is
necessary for forgiveness is referred to by Charles Griswold as the "narrative"14 of
forgiveness:
The narrative characterizes what is happening or happened; in so doing it reshapes
it, or remembers it, or re-imagines it, but does not thereby fabricate it out of thin
air. So narrative here claims to represent, in some sense, how things are (or
were), what happened, and why - not just causally "why" but why from the
perspective of the agent.15
The dialogical nature of the narrative between the victim and her offender is important,
because it recognizes the moral dignity of both parties, as well as remembers the injuries.
However, the narrative itself does not constitute forgiveness. Instead, it is a necessary
component of any morally significant forgiveness. The narrative acknowledges the
agency of the offender, and her responsibility for causing the injuries. But if the narrative
establishes the moral standing of the offender and the victim, as well as serves as an
account of the injuries, yet does not constitute forgiveness, then what does forgiveness

For a detailed account of the role of apologies see Smith, / was Wrong.
14

See Griswold, Forgiveness, 98-110.

15

Griswold, Forgiveness, 99.
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entail? Bishop Butler believes forgiveness boils down to loving the offender, whereas
"'love' is being understood here not so much as a feeling but as the recognition that even
the most heinous human being is still' a sensible creature; that is, capable of happiness or
misery."16 Repentance is important for an ideal forgiveness, because it initiates the moral
interlocution. Forgiving without a remorseful apology raises motivational concerns for
the victim, because "people who forgive too readily ... do not manifest the right degree
of self-respect; they underestimate their own worth and fail to take their projects and
entitlements seriously enough,"17 as well as devalue their own moral standing in the
process.
Conversely, the victim may require an apology in order to accept her offender "as
18

a morally worthy person capable of more than wrongdoing."

If the victim demonizes

her offender by only understanding her through the sufferings she caused, then
forgiveness is impossible, because forgiveness requires a dialog between the parties. Or
rather, the "recognition of shared humanity by the injured party is a necessary step on the
way to forgiveness ... though it is not sufficient for it."19 It is this acknowledgement of
the humanity of the other that I feel is important a dialogical forgiveness, because serious
wrongs may prohibit the victim from understanding her offender as anything other than
the source of her sufferings. If the offender is demonized in the eyes of the victim, then
the distinction between the offense and the offender, which I will argue allows for the
unforgivable, becomes blurred. Of course, there are forms of forgiveness that are not
16

Griswold, Forgiveness, 33.

17

David Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect," from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.
58, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 299-315, (International Phenomenological Society), 299.
18

Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 60.

19

Griswold, Forgiveness, 79.

6

dialogical, such as forgiving the dead, or forgiving an unspecified offender. However,
the current discussion will only address such varieties of forgiveness briefly, because a
victim cannot seek revenge against her offender if the offender is dead. Although much
more can be said about the offender's remorse and the relationship of apologies to
forgiveness, for the sake of brevity I conclude that an apologetic expression of remorse is
an ideal condition for forgiveness, regardless of whether the victim forgives the offender,
or its deontological standing. I will now begin to unpack what forgiveness entails.
Many commentators have followed Bishop Butler's definition of forgiveness as
the foreswearing of resentment.20 Butler defines resentment by distinguishing it
"between two species: the first is 'hasty and sudden' anger; the second is 'settled anger,'
which turns out to be 'deliberate resentment, malice, and revenge.'"21 Although some
offenses may not involve resentment, "we recognize, albeit tacitly, that it is always
possible that others will see these wrongs differently, take umbrage, or feel resentful."22
So at the very least, forgiveness requires that there has been an injury, however
insignificant. Minor offenses often do not engender "hard feelings of anger and
resentment consequent on the wrong; hence no need to banish these feelings through
forgiveness."

The forgiveness associated with minor offenses can easily be attained,

because such forgiveness does not challenge the victim to overcome and forswear her
resentment. If forgiveness could always be attained as easily as the forgiveness

See Griswold, Forgiveness.
Griswold, Forgiveness, 22.
22

Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect," 301.

23

Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect," 302.
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associated with minor offenses such as stepping on someone else's toes, then it would
similarly be morally insignificant.
The forswearing of resentment in individual instances of forgiveness requires the
victim not to respond to her anger by seeking revenge or reciprocating her "pain and
misery."
revenge."

To be more precise, Butler "claims that forgiveness is the forswearing of
Note how the forswearing of revenge cannot be applicable to non-dialogical

forms of forgiveness, such as forgiving the dead. It is important to distinguish resentment
and the desire for revenge, because the presence of resentment is also important for
forgiveness. The victim of an offense could seek revenge in many different ways.
Revenge vaguely encompasses any retaliation the victim embarks on herself against the
offender, but does not exclude any retributive justice the victim may wish to claim in
response to her injuries. For example, the victim may require her offender to be punished
by a court of law before she is willing to forgive. The Kantian principle of justice is
based on "the principle of equality (in the position of the needle on the scale of justice),
to incline no more to one side than to the other. Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil
you inflict upon another within the people, that you inflict upon yourself."26 However,
revenge may surpass the "eye for an eye" mentality that the punishment should fit the
crime, because the victim may want her offender to suffer disproportionately. Retributive
justice may be distinguished from revenge, because "forgiveness is [not] incompatible
with punishment."27 For example, I could refuse to forgive a friend for crushing my foot

Griswold, Forgiveness, 31.
25

Griswold, Forgiveness, 20.

26

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by Mary Gregor, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 105, Royal Prussian Academy of Science Pagination 6:332.
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with her car when drunk until after she had been punished by a third party, presumably a
court of law. Conversely, I could refuse to forgive my friend at all, and instead seek
disproportional revenge by trying to inflict similar physical pains, and also seeking to
inflict additional mental and emotional anguish. Although such vengefulness is not
morally legitimized by the original injury, it is worth noting that any vengeful retaliation
can be subsumed under the notion of revenge that forgiveness forswears.
Revenge is forsworn because it is the reciprocation of a moral offense, and thus
another moral offense, regardless of the victim's justification. For example, if a rape
victim were so emotionally distraught that she sought revenge against her attacker by
killing him, then she is still guilty of murder, regardless of her motivations. Forgiveness,
on the other hand, counters a moral offense with a promise not to seek revenge.
Although this does not right the wrong caused by the original offense, that the desire to
seek revenge is forsworn is morally praiseworthy, because the offender remains a moral
agent. That is, forgiveness is morally praiseworthy, because of the moral respect it grants
the offender, despite her offenses. When we forgive, we forgive our offenders, but we do
not condone their offenses. In this way, revenge and retaliation are acts that are in
response to another act. They need to be directed at the offender as a person, but at her as
the cause of the injuries. It is important to distinguish revenge as retaliation against a
deed, and revenge against the person for the discussion of the unforgivable. Similarly,
forgiveness forswears revenge against either the injury, the offender, or both.
The role of resentment in forgiveness is more muddied than that of revenge,
because resentment must be expanded to include other negative emotions and reactions to

Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 60.

9

the crimes, such as contempt or sadness, which do not simply disappear when the
victim forgives her offender. Instead, "the serious wrongs that require our forgiveness
cannot be morally condoned, and their pardon, if secured, will only involve the
renouncement of our claims against the wrongdoer but will not straightforwardly result in
the abandonment of the bitter feelings that these wrongs have occasioned."29 Resentment
is important for forgiveness, because "to forgive is not to forget the wrongs we have
suffered but rather to regard their perpetrators, and the wrongs themselves, in the moral
light of acceptance and compassion rather than in the glare of resentment and hatred."30
Forswearing resentment allows the victim to overcome the emotional and psychological
damages the injuries occasioned. Resentment must also be forsworn to understand the
offender as a moral interlocutor who is worthy of moral respect, and not merely
demonized by the lingering resentment. Also, the forswearing of resentment may be
psychologically and emotionally beneficial to the victim; it allows forgiveness to be
understood as more than the morally beneficial absolution of the offender's crimes. But
not all resentment is demonizing, nor does it necessitate that the offender is interpreted as
a "moral monster."31 Forgiveness requires that resentment is forsworn if the resentment
causes the victim to demonize her offender, and if the resentment is be psychologically
and emotionally detrimental to the victim's well-being. Thus forswearing revenge can be
beneficial to the victim, especially in instances where revenge is impossible, such as
forgiving the dead.
28

See Norvin Richards, "Forgiveness," from Ethics, Vol. 99, No. 1 (Oct., 1988), pp. 77-97 (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press), 79.
29

Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect," 301.

30

Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 60.

31

See Griswold, Forgiveness, 73-7.
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However, the challenge of forswearing resentment may pose many difficulties for
the victim,32 because the resentment may not be initially apparent, and the victim may not
feel any negative emotions towards her offenders until well after the injuries have
occurred. Once an injury has been forgiven, the victim may regain her resentfulness
years later. The victim may be incapable of completely overcoming her resentment. The
lingering resentment depends on the nature of the injury. For example, if I resent a close
friend for damaging and forgetting to return a valued book, then the value of our
continued friendship may allow me to forgive her, and the resentment may dissipate with
time. However, if this friend intentionally set fire to my home, then our friendship will
become strained, if it is not ended. Furthermore, I may continue to resent her for such
irreparable malice, and wish to inflict a similar misfortune. However, I may still forgive
this friend when I promise not to seek retribution for the injuries suffered. Furthermore,
my resentment need not demoralize or dehumanize my friend, because of the history of
our friendship. Instead, I would be able to engage in the moral dialog of forgiveness with
my former friend, despite my resentment. On the other hand, my resentment may be
necessary for my desire to seek revenge for the injuries suffered, and thus resentment is
necessary for forgiveness. Although the resentment may linger, resentment is necessary
for forgiveness, because resentment encompasses revenge. That is, without feeling
resentment, the victim would lack a desire to seek revenge, remembering that revenge
can be distinguished from punishment or retributive justice, because the desire for
revenge may be subsumed under resentment. However, once forgiveness has been
achieved, resentment is no longer a necessary condition. That is, the moral value of the

Richards, "Forgiveness," 77.
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achievement of forgiveness does not speak to whether or not the victim retains her
resentment. At the very least, the retention of resentment is dependent on the nature of
the forgiveness and the injuries, and thus resentment cannot be categorically supposed to
last after the injuries have been forgiven.
The indefinite nature of the victim's negative emotions and resentment does not
imply that the act of forgiving is similarly indefinite. If forgiveness is indefinite, then
inaction would constitute forgiveness: the absence of retaliation does not imply that the
victim has forgiven her offender. The silent harboring of resentment, which does not lead
to retaliation, does not mean that the offender has been forgiven.33 Also, it is worth
noting that memory is important to forgiveness, forgetting could be mistaken as the
forswearing of revenge, and thus forgiveness. However, forgiveness is not a passive act,
and "remembrance itself... can to some extent repair the past wrongs and express respect
for the victims."3 Instead, I believe that forgiveness is a definite moral act that is worthy
of moral appraisal, and that it is not a moral virtue,35 nor can it be achieved by passively
forgetting the injuries. The victim must perform a definitive act of forgiveness by
forswearing revenge and resentment. Although retribution and revenge may be morally
blameworthy, the blame is intensified if they occur after forgiveness has been achieved.
The satisfaction or expression of anger and resentment through revenge is
incompatible with forgiveness, because any ensuing forgiveness would seem insincere, if
not inappropriate. Forgiveness and revenge are mutually exclusive, but forgiveness is not
33

Griswold, Forgiveness, 31.

34

Jeffrey Blustein, The Moral Demands of Memory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 21.

35

Although a detailed account of these differing interpretations of forgiveness would be appropriate, they
will merely be acknowledged for the sake of brevity. For a comprehensive discussion of these differing
interpretations, see Griswold, Forgiveness, pp. 1-89.
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binary; it is not the case that forgiveness is either granted or it is not. There are many
other ways a victim could react to her injuries that do not involve retribution or
forgiveness, and refusing to seek revenge is not the same as forgiving the offender.
Revenge, on the other hand, need not be enacted by the victim. Instead, she may allow a
third party, such as the judicial system, to punish her offender. Forgiveness and revenge
can be distinguished from third party punishment,37 "especially where the injured party is
no longer capable of responding to the offender, those intimately affected often assume
they have a right to forgive or to refuse to forgive."38 Individual forgiveness can be
achieved even if the offender has been punished by a third party.

36

Forgiveness and revenge are distinguished from "the administration of justice," see Griswold,
Forgiveness, 32.
37

See Smith, / Was Wrong, 135.

38

Griswold, Forgiveness, 117.
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CHAPTER II

INDIVIDUAL FORGIVENESS AND THE UNFORGIVABLE

The previous chapter outlined some of the ideal conditions for forgiveness as it
applies to individuals. I will now turn to a discussion of the unforgivable. It is important
to note that a majority of the philosophical literature on forgiveness denies the possibility
of some crimes being completely beyond the possibility of forgiveness. Those that
accept the unforgivable, namely Arendt and Derrida, are hopelessly vague in their
discussions. In order to try to unpack a notion of the unforgivable, I will distinguish the
crimes from their source; the offender. So although an offender may never be completely
beyond the realm of forgiveness, the injuries she occasioned may be unforgivable.
However, following Griswold, "I cannot assert or deny, in the abstract, that every wrongdoer is in practice forgivable" because "it is possible - indeed it is the case - that some
offenders turn out to be incapable of remorse, choice, and moral transformation."3

If

forgiveness requires a remorseful apology from the offender, then it would seem that
those incapable of remorse are unforgivable. But this raises questions concerning the
sincerity of the remorse, the nature of the injuries that could prohibit regret, the moral
agency of the unremorseful, and any psychological conditions that may prohibit remorse,
among others. Furthermore, the victim may refuse to accept the apology, regardless of
the sincerity of the remorse. So it would be a great undertaking to assess the
39

Griswold, Forgiveness, 94, 93.
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unforgivable solely in light of the requirement that the offender express her regret for
forgiveness, especially since apologetic remorse is debated as a requirement for
forgiveness.
It could assumed that if forgiveness requires the forswearing of revenge and
resentment, then a crime that is beyond the possibility of forgiveness would be beyond
the possibility of forswearing revenge and resentment. However, the unforgivable cannot
require the victim to seek revenge, because it would be a mistake to understand the
unforgivable as requiring the continuation of offenses. That is, it would be inappropriate
for a moral system to include a requirement for offenses to be perpetuated indefinitely.
And although this could be what Arendt meant by saying that radical evil is beyond the
possibility of forgiveness or punishment,40 it also seems that the unforgivable can be
punished. For example, if murder is an unforgivable offense, then it would be a mistake
to think of murderers as beyond the possibility of punishment or retributive justice.
Beyond the forswearing of revenge, forgiveness also requires the forswearing of
resentment, but only if the injuries caused such resentment that the victim demonizes her
offender. Such demonization prohibits the moral interlocution for forgiveness. But if the
injuries are beyond the possibility of forgiveness, then it would be appropriate if the
offender is demonized, because the offender would be inseparably tied to the evilness of
her crimes. There are certainly injuries, such as rape and murder that elicit immense
resentment. However, the resentment associated with such crimes may still be forsworn,
and the victims41 may still forgive. Forgiving such violent crimes might only occur after

Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, 137-50.
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the offender has been punished. For example, a convicted murderer may be remorseful
and forgiven by the families of his victims. But just because the murderer is forgiven
does not mean that murder is a forgivable crime. Deontological accounts of forgiveness
never excuse murder, because it is inherently wrong to take another's life, although
forgiving the murderer might be allowed for any number of reasons. For example, killing
in self defense is still taking the life of another, but the attacked can be excused if the
attacker was unprovoked, and the victim's life was unquestionably threatened. My
account of the unforgivable requires a distinction between the offender and the offense.
This line of argument would raise the concern that any offense is unforgivable, because
of its offensive nature. That is, we cannot forgive any act, although we may forgive the
actor. But this line of thinking is only inappropriate if forgiveness forgives both the
offender and the offense she occasioned, because although we may never condone certain
acts, we often forgive their actors. This brings us to the distinction between the
unforgivable injuries, and an unforgivable offender.
In unpacking the unforgivable, it is important to note that Archbishop Desmond
Tutu "insisted that though their deeds were monstrous, human beings should never be
described as monsters, [and] he expressed a long tradition of Christian thought
emphasizing that the sinner should be separated from the sin."42 A secular account would
distinguish agents from their actions, and allow for an account of both unforgivable
crimes, and unforgivable agents. If the offender is understood as separate and distinct
from the injuries she caused, and not as a moral monster, then she may be forgiven,
41

Murder victims obviously are not in any position to forgive their offenders. However, secondary victims,
such as the deceased's family, could forgive the murderer. See Piers Benn, "Forgiveness and Loyalty,"
from Philosophy, Vol. 71, No. 277, (July 1996), pp. 369-383.

42

Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 65.
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because "forgiveness is something we extend or do not extend towards persons, and it
fundamentally affects the relationships between persons. And yet, it is deeds which are
said to be unforgivable."43 For example, rape, torture, and murder are often cited as
unforgivable acts, because they are so repulsive and heinous. Intuitively, we would not
require an analysis of why such crimes are unforgivable. For the sake of argument,
however, it could be asked whether or not such crimes could be forgiven. The offender
may be forgiven for the victim's "peace of mind" and ability to overcome the trauma she
suffered, but are the crimes themselves forgivable? For example, we may forgive a
murderer, but we would never condone such malicious killing. So it seems to me that the
answer would have to be negative, although this is clearly debatable. The fact that we
can never condone such malicious acts is sufficient justification for their unforgivability,
even though we may forgive the perpetrators. This represents a disconnect within
forgiveness: we endorse forgiveness as morally praiseworthy, but we never endorse the
crimes being forgiven. Instead, we only support that the offender is forgiven.
This would appear to lead to the contradiction, because if all offenses can never
be condoned, then all offenses are unforgivable, but forgiving the offenders is endorsed.
There are some offenses that might have dire moral consequences, such as forgetting to
drive a sick friend to a scheduled doctor's appointment, that are forgivable in principle. I
may be forgiven for my forgetfulness, because we have all forgotten to fulfill important
promises at some point, and the outcome of the offense can have dire consequences. So
it need not be the case that all offenses that cannot be condoned are themselves
unforgivable. However, it is rarely the case that we forgive the injuries we suffer, but not
our offenders. For example, I may forgive a friend for forgetting to pick me up at the
Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 65.

17

airport, thus causing me to miss an important event, say a funeral. But in so doing, I am
excusing my friend, but I am not forgiving her forgetfulness itself. This is not to say that
we ignore the injuries we suffered when we forgive our offenders, or that we never
forgive the injuries themselves. But whenever we do forgive an offense, we usually
forgive the offender as well. Forgiveness typically includes both the crime and the
offender, but some injuries may be so profound that is humanly impossible44 to forgive
either the crime itself, the offender, or both.
It should be noted that the previous example does not intuitively qualify as an
unforgivable offense. Instead, my unwillingness to forgive my friend does not mean that
she is unforgivable, merely unforgiven. It is important to distinguish the unforgivable
from the unforgiven. The unforgiven is simply an offense that has not been forgiven by
the victim. Although the offense may be morally blameworthy if the offender has
expressed remorse and offered to make amends for the sufferings she caused, the
offender is not beyond the possibility of forgiveness. The unforgivable, on the other
hand, cannot be forgiven. But the unforgivable does not imply that the offender cannot
be forgiven, unless the offender is incapable of being distinguished from her offenses.
Instead, it means that a particular injury cannot be forgiven, but unless the offender is
reduced to her offenses, then the offender may still be forgiven.
So why are some injuries beyond the possibility of forgiveness? If it is
impossible to understand the offender as a moral interlocutor, presumably because of the
severity of her offenses, then forgiveness becomes impossible. That is, one cannot offer
a moral forgiveness to a non-moral entity. This may seem odd, and raises questions
concerning forgiving the dead, who are no longer moral agents, or forgiveness in general.
Griswold, Forgiveness, 94.
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Forgiving the dead is interesting, because as stated above, I believe that remorse is
essential for an ideal forgiveness, and the dead clearly cannot express remorse to their
victims. But I do not wish to rule out the possibility of forgiving the dead, because such
forgiveness clearly has psychological implications for the victims. But the psychology of
such forgiveness is very ends-oriented, and does not necessitate deontological
forgiveness. Even if there is a moral duty to forgive the dead, then the forgiveness is not
directed at a moral agent, but instead at the moral importance of the memory of the
deceased. That is, the dead are not beyond the possibility of forgiveness, because to
forgive the dead is more directly tied to the victim's well being, and not the moral
interlocution of forgiveness.
So how is an offender reduced to a non-moral entity that is beyond the possibility
of forgiveness? Such dehumanization is the result of the immense resentment the
offender has caused. If the offender cannot be understood as separate and distinct from
the sufferings she caused, then she may be understood as beyond the possibility of
forgiveness. The demonization of the offender cannot be subjectively determined by the
victim alone, but by the moral community. The moral community does not imply the
legal system as a third party, because such unforgivable offenses are not beyond the
possibility of punishment. This goes against Arendt's conception of radical evil and the
unforgivable as being beyond the possibility of forgiveness or punishment.
This is not to say that notorious individuals such as Hitler are forgivable.
However, Hitler is indistinguishable from the Holocaust, which is beyond the possibility
of forgiveness. "Nonetheless it would be true that a person who is in principle
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unforgivable warrants resentment forever."

Thus, resentment would be tied to the

unforgivable more so than the forgivable. But imagine a murderer getting away with
killing, and never being accused of the crime, thereby not invoking any resentment.
Furthermore, imagine that her victim did not have any close friends or family, and lived
in obscurity, thus leaving no survivors to mourn her death, let alone resent the murderer.
If murder is unforgivable, then it would seem that this particular murderer is not exempt
simply because of the circumstances of her crime. But how are such deeds unforgivable,
and can the unforgivable truly be distinct from the offenders who are the sources of such
injuries? Forgiveness requires the forswearing of resentment only if the resentment
dehumanizes the offender. The unforgivable is primarily concerned with those who have
been demonized by their victims, and would not be distinct from the sufferings she
caused. Although an individual offender may be unforgivable, the above discussion is
purposefully complicated. I will now demonstrate how collective injuries are more easily
understood as unforgivable.

See Griswold, Forgiveness, 92-3.
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CHAPTER III

COLLECTIVE FORGIVENESS

The defining characteristics of individual forgiveness in the previous chapters are
primarily applicable to individuals, and pose difficulties for collective forgiveness. This
chapter will address some of the inherent difficulties with collective forgiveness. The
first of which is determining what constitutes a collective. A collective may be a random
group of individuals, or a group "whose members have some property or properties in
common and whose identity is something more than the aggregated identities of its
individual members."46 A group may be identified as a collective by its members, or by
an external group; the members of a collective need not identify with the group. Instead,
the members of a collective can be identified as belonging to a particular collective by
others: "the possession of common features by the members of a [collective] does not
entail that the group has coherence as an entity in its own right and that its members are
unified is some way.... They may not even be aware of each other's existence."47
Collective forgiveness requires that the group has suffered similar injuries, because it
would be useless to define a collective as unrelated individuals who have suffered
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unrelated injuries from completely different offenders. For our purposes, a collective is a
group that has been identified as such, and has suffered at the hands of another group.
However, the collective injuries are not necessarily the result of such identification.
Not all collectives must be defined negatively by such characteristics, or
identified because of its collective injuries. For example, doctors and lawyers are
generally understood favorably, because of the prestige and honor associated with their
positions. The positive classification of doctors and lawyers is applied to them as a
collective, regardless of individual experiences with incompetent doctors or "greedy
lawyers." In terms of collective forgiveness, however, it is often the case that negative
characteristics are the defining features that allow such a group to be systematically
discriminated against, or the justification for the injuries the group suffers. For example,
the United States' history of racial discrimination shows how "historically, blacks were
oppressed and discriminated against because they were black, in a legal-political order
that assumed they deserved less than equal respect and consideration because of their
race."48 African Americans were viewed collectively by their offenders, and
discriminated against because of such collective identifications.
It is important to note that the identification of a collective is often blurred. The
discriminatory injuries suffered by African Americans shared the underlying theme of
racial motivations, and can thus be understood as collective in nature, despite how each
individual suffered separately. However, African Americans are a sub-collective of

48
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Americans, and their offenders also belong to the umbrella collective of Americans.
The distinctions between the offenders and the victims have become so blurred that any
forgiveness would seem impossible. Collective injuries are the crimes committed against
the collective, and are composed of a multitude of individual injuries. However, the
victims all suffered similarly because they had been collectively identified and targeted
by their offenders. The Holocaust is an example where European Jews collectively
suffered similar injuries because they had been collectively targeted by the Nazis. It is
not the case that an individual's sufferings in the Holocaust were merely an instance of a
single offender targeting a single victim. In this way, the overarching and
indiscriminate50 nature of the Nazis' persecution of Jews can be understood as a
collective injury.
Collective injuries are not necessarily the sum of the individual injuries, although
such may be the case. For example, American segregation is a collective injury that
inevitably fails to catalog all instances of racially-justified and racially-motivated
injuries, because countless injuries have been unrecorded and lost to the pages of time.
The loss of such details does not prohibit collective forgiveness, although collective
forgiveness for the entire history of American slavery, segregation, discrimination, and
racism may be impossible to achieve, and will be argued to be unforgivable. Collective
injuries create difficulties for understanding the role of the individual, because of their

This does not include the European slave traders who also committed collective injuries.
5

I use "indiscriminate" here to refer to the unspecific nature of a given individual's injuries. Collective
injuries are often motivated and justified by discrimination.
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impersonal nature. Although a collective injury may be collectively forgiven, a member
of the victimized collective may be unable to endorse the group's forgiveness. That is,
there is a problem with consensus. This is not to imply that all collective forgiveness can
be categorically rejected as conceptual and practical impossibilities. Instead, the size of a
collective directly influences whether or not collective forgiveness is possible. But in
theory, collective forgiveness remains possible, despite the practical difficulties of
achieving reconciliation. To achieve collective forgiveness, the offenders would have to
offer the collective a remorseful apology, and then the collective would have to forswear
revenge against their offenders, as well as acknowledge their shared humanity.
The achievement of collective forgiveness depends on the size of the collective.
For example, if a rock and roll band uses offensive lyrics towards women in its songs,
then the band as a whole is held responsible, not just the composer of the lyrics. The
band could apologize to the public, promise to never perform the songs that include the
offensive lyrics, make efforts to support women's rights, and subsequently be forgiven.
Despite the oversimplification of this example, most notably the unspecified victims and
the ease with which such forgiveness appears to have been achieved, it can be understood
how small groups can also be viewed as collectives. Furthermore, collective forgiveness
seems, at least on the surface, to be practically attainable for small groups. However,
larger collectives, such as those affected by American slavery and the ensuing
segregation, would clearly pose a greater difficulty.
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Collective forgiveness resembles individual forgiveness, in that Collective B
forgives Collective A for X injuries Collective A caused B to suffer. Similar to
individual forgiveness, the offending collective would have to offer a remorseful apology
in order to be forgiven. However, agreeing on the nature and extent of X creates
problems for collective forgiveness. That is, collective forgiveness requires the
Collective B to agree not to retaliate for the injuries they have suffered. A substantial
difficulty of any attempt at collective forgiveness is the accommodation of the interests of
the individuals within a collective. For example, each member of the collective
presumably suffered the collective injuries differently, and thus the forgiveness would
have different meanings to each individual. Some members may refuse to forgive their
offenders; they need not all agree to forgive. Even if the collective can decide
collectively not to retaliate for injuries x, y, and z, does not imply that the members agree
on the nature of such injuries, or that the injuries in question are the only ones that are
appropriate for the forgiveness.
The difficulties of individual interests and collective agreement are compounded
as the sizes of the collective increases. Another example could be a nation forswearing
revenge against an offending neighbor by not going to war, and forgiving the neighboring
nation for their trespasses. It is not expected that every member within the collective
agree to such forgiveness, because of the inevitable difficulties of achieving a consensus.
Indeed, some members of the victimized nation might desire violence and retribution for
the injuries they have suffered. However, a collective can be a separate agent that is
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distinct from its members. For example, the United States is a collective that is
understood as an individual entity, not as the sum of its citizens. The policies and acts of
the US are rarely endorsed or opposed by an overwhelming percentage of the population,
and often times there is strong disagreement. The difficulty of achieving consensus is
one of the primary difficulties in any discussion of collective forgiveness. Agreement
becomes more problematic as the size of the collective, such as the United States,
becomes larger. As with any collective, actions may be taken without a consensus, and
such acts reflect on the collective as a whole. Furthermore, the collective's desire to seek
revenge, or at least be resentful for the injuries, will inevitably lack a consensus.
Agreement in a collective becomes more important when dealing with collective
injuries. Although the collective forgives as a whole, single, unified agent, its members
presumably suffered differently. For example, imagine the United States government
offering a collective apology for its endorsement of the enslavement and the ensuing
discrimination of Africans throughout its history. Attempting to exemplify such an
apology seems impossible, because it is either too brief and does not adequately quantify
the moral significance of the injuries, or it could be too long, making it unwieldy and
causing many of the injuries to be "lost in the shuffle." However, as argued above, my
interpretations of forgiveness require that the offenders offer sincere and remorseful
apologies for the injuries they caused. Apologies are necessary for individual
forgiveness, because they start the moral dialog about the nature of the injuries.
Collective apologies serve the same purpose, but are complicated as collective
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forgiveness. But even if an acceptable apology was to be offered, and the African
American community was to collectively decide to accept it and forgive the US
government, some members would have suffered differently. This is important, because
of the tensions created between collective forgiveness, and the interests of its members.
Non-dialogical forms of forgiveness (forgiving the dead) was mention briefly above, and
but the difficulties of one-sided forgiveness is also compounded for collectives.
Another difference between individual and collective forgiveness is the role of
memory. Although it was only alluded to briefly above, individual forgiveness requires
the memory of the injuries, so that the appropriate harms can be forgiven. However, the
remembrance of the injuries is not necessary after they have been forgiven, although such
remembrance could explain any lingering resentment. Large instances of collective
forgiveness, on the other hand, require a different sort of remembrance of the injuries.
Returning to the example of American history of endorsing racially based slavery and
segregation, if such forgiveness could be achieved, it is not the case that every American
citizen must remember the details of each and every injury subsumed under the collective
injury. A collective is not the sum of its members, so it is not required that all members
of the collective remember the injuries, and such remembrance would be impossible.
Instead, the injuries are remembered through a generalized history, specifically the
history of the collective.
When nations or otherwise organized groups involving multiple individuals
attempt to establish an agreement on the injuries suffered with another large group, the
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inevitable disagreements could be insurmountable. Beyond the initial limitations of the
countless unrecorded injuries suffered that could not be included, there are instances in
which the offending parties refuse to participate in the dialog, or refuse to admit to
committing such crimes. Such a refusal to participate in a dialog to establish a narrative
could be interpreted as an instance in which the offenders are unwilling accept the moral
standings of their victims, and thus may not allow the offenders to be fully forgiven. At
the same time, a partially agreed-upon narrative and an unforgiving group of victims
could further the animosity between the victims and the offenders. But even a partially
agreed-upon narrative would accomplish the task of acknowledging the moral standing of
both parties, because of the moral dialog necessary to agree on at least some of the
injuries. In this sense, even if resentment is not forsworn and the victims' claims against
their offenders are not disavowed, the moral standing of both groups would be
recognized. The offenders' recognition of the morality of their victims could also
acknowledge the wrongness of the injustices, and could indirectly promise that such
crimes will not be repeated. Even if they do not forgive their offenders, this indirect
promise may suffice for the victims. The collaboration on a narrative runs the risk that if
important details are neglected or forgotten, then additional harms could result from such
a loss of details. For example, it would seem that in reconciling with Germany after the
Holocaust, additional harms would be created if the Auschwitz death camp were
completely forgotten. In this sense, there seems to be a duty to remember such harms,
and to fail to remember them is itself another injury. From here, it is important to
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remember the distinction between collective identities, and how the collective remembers
particular details, from individual memory and how individuals may suffer greater harms
from the lack of such details. Just because a collectively agreed-upon narrative may not
include some particular details does not imply that the individuals within the collectives
would forget them, or that their particular sufferings can be accounted for as the
collective forgiveness is then disseminated. That is, the individual details can be
encompassed by the collective memory and forgiveness, and then acknowledged by the
individuals themselves.
The injuries that are necessary for individual forgiveness are required to cause the
victim to resent her offender, because she cannot forswear revenge unless the revenge is
motivated by resentment. However, the role of the resentment loses its importance after
forgiveness has been achieved: whether or not the victim retains her resentment does not
influence the forgiveness after it had been achieved. Collective forgiveness, on the other
hand, need not require resentment at all. More specifically, the resentment need not be
experienced by all members of the collective, or even the collective as a whole, because
there could be other motivations for collective forgiveness that are not subsumed under
resentment and revenge. That is, "both offenders and victims have reasons to overlook
obstacles confronting collective [forgiveness]"51 that are dependent on the nature of the
collective injuries, and the relationship between the parties. The many difficulties of
achieving collective forgiveness are readily apparent,52 but do not imply that the
51
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collective injuries are unforgivable. However, unforgivable injuries must be collective.
The next chapter will discuss the collective nature of the unforgivable, and distinguish the
unforgivable from the unforgiven.

52
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CHAPTER IV

COLLECTIVE FORGIVENESS AND THE UNFORGIVABLE

The previous chapters defined forgiveness, and showed some of the ways
forgiveness is more difficult to achieve for collectives. The difficulties of some instances
of collective forgiveness cause the injuries to remain unforgiven. I now will argue that
the collective crimes cataloged by Tutu in the introduction are not merely unforgiven, but
unforgivable. Similar to the difficulties of interpreting the unforgivable for individual
injuries, collective injuries can be understood as distinct from the offensive collective. If
a collective is defined by its offenses, then the group may be unforgivable, even though
some of its members may be forgiven for their individual participation in the injuries.
Although there are difficulties in separating the injury from the offender for individual
forgiveness, the offender has a different moral relationship to the victim than the injury.
If the crime can be distinguished from the offender, and if the moral community cannot
endorse such injuries, then the crime may be unforgivable. A collective, on the other
hand, may be defined by the injuries it inflicts. If a collective cannot be separate from the
suffering it inflicts, and if such injuries are unforgivable, then the collective may be
unforgivable as well. This clearly requires some greater explanation.
I argued above that crimes are never condoned, even though the agents that cause
such injuries may still be forgiven. The agent and her act are fundamentally distinct. If
the injustice of the crime is granted, and if the agent cannot be distinguished from the
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injustice, then the agent and the injustice would also be indistinguishable: the agent is
unjust. A collective may be defined in many different ways, but in regard to collective
forgiveness, the offending collective may be defined by its members' shared participation
in the collective injuries. If a collective cannot be distinguished from the injuries it
causes, and if such injuries are deemed unforgivable, then the collective may also be
unforgivable. However, each individual member of the collective is not similarly
unforgivable, because individuals may not be beyond the possibility of forgiveness. For
example, the Ku Klux Klan is a militant white supremacist group that was formed out of
racially unjust motives, and participated in the murder of countless African Americans.
These murders are unforgivable, and the Klan is a collective that has been united by such
violence, so the KKK can be interpreted as an unforgivable collective.
A collective that has been defined by its unforgivable crimes may be beyond the
possibility of punishment, but this is not to say that every individual member of the
collective is similarly unforgivable. For example, the Nazis cannot be discussed without
invoking World War II and the Holocaust. The Holocaust is the epitome of an
unforgivable offense, and so the Nazis may be unforgivable because of their inseparable
association with the Holocaust. However, not every member of the Nazi party must
likewise be unforgivable. Several were coerced to join the Nazi party, and they opposed
the persecution of the Jews. These individuals were nominally Nazis, but that is the
extent of their association with the Holocaust, and thus they are not unforgivable.
Conversely, Hitler is inseparable from either the Nazis or the Holocaust, and so he may
be unforgivable.
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The ability to forgive some members of an unforgivable collective cannot be
reduced to the fact that all members of the collective can be forgiven, because such a
reduction would imply a distinction between the collective and its members. Although
such a reduction is not impossible, and depending on how the collective has been
grouped, could be possible, this is not always the case. Just as there are difficulties in
achieving collective forgiveness, because of the different roles each individual played in
the injury, some individuals within a collective are inherently tied to the collective's
crimes. For example, the president and/or CEO of a corporation may be held accountable
for the company's actions, because her position is so closely related to the company that
the individual cannot be divorced from his position. Similarly, many of the company's
employees have little to no input concerning the company's affairs, and thus are separate
and distinct from the company collective. Of course, if the collective is punished as a
whole, or if its victims seek collective revenge against it, then all members might share
equally in such retributive justice.
The unforgivable is not merely beyond the possibility of forgiveness because it
deals with collective crimes. Instead, the unforgivable is based on Hannah Arendt's
notion of "radical evil." Arendt's description of "absolute evil" in the first edition of The
Origins of Totalitarianism illustrates the unforgivable: "When the impossible was made
possible it became the unpunishable, unforgivable absolute evil."53 The unforgivable
must be beyond the possibility of punishment. However, the key members of the
collective can surely be punished for their roles in the collective injuries. For example,
the CEO could be indicted for authorizing her company's actions, but a legally
sanctioned punishment of all members of the company is not applicable.
5
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In Chapter I, I argued that a victim can still forgive her offender, even after the
offender has been punished by a third party. Individual forgiveness allows for a
distinction between punishment and revenge. Although collectives may have difficulty
of designating a third party arbitrator as a moral authority to punish their offenders,
punishment can also coexist with collective forgiveness, and is distinct from the
forswearing of revenge. If the unforgivable is beyond the possibility of forgiveness and
punishment, then revenge and punishment become similarly impossible. Because of this,
the unforgivable does not require a distinction between revenge and punishment, because
they are both impossible retaliations against the offenders. This means that an
unforgivable collective injury cannot be forgiven by a third party.
If a crime can be punished, then the punishment must fit the crime. This is not to
say crimes that are neither punished nor forgiven are instances of the radical evil, as
Arendt believes. One could argue that murder is unforgivable. However, according to
Arendt, the unforgivable is beyond punishment and forgiveness. A murderer can be
forgiven, and she most certainly may be punished. Such forms of punishment often
include capital punishment, or life imprisonment, both of which represent the "eye for an
eye" mentality that the punishment should fit the crime.
Collective murders are beyond the possibility of punishment, because there is no
punishment that would adequately fit the crime. In the case of American slavery and the
ensuing segregation, there are no ways such injuries could be reciprocated or reflected in
an appropriate punishment. Furthermore, the notions of offenders and victims are so
blurred that the collective recipients of the punishment would be unwieldy and difficult to
comprehend. But just because the punishment is beyond the realm of practicality does
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not imply that the collective crimes, American slavery, are unforgivable. The notion of
collective forgiveness, and its connection to the unforgivable will need to be unpacked
further. Furthermore, it must be asked whether the notion of "beyond punishment" can
be understood theoretically, if such punishment cannot possibly be realized. If
punishment is beyond practicality, then the crime is unforgiven, but not necessarily
unforgivable. It is conceivable that a small group of white extremists could be punished
for their racially motivated collective crimes against a small group of African Americans.
If the offenders are neither punished, nor forgiven, then their crimes remain unforgiven.
However, as a sample of the large issue of racially motivated discrimination, their part of
the overarching collective injuries cannot be forgiven; it is unforgivable.
Collective injuries are unforgivable because they are dehumanizing in nature.
Although I primarily rely on Arendt's description of the unforgivable as radical evil, it is
worth examining a few other interpretations of the unforgivable. Charles Griswold
believes that "no agent is absolutely and forever unforgivable."54 First, it is noteworthy
that Griswold denies the possibility of the unforgivable for individuals, which coincides
with my argument that only collective injuries are unforgivable. More importantly, his
justification is that deeming someone unforgivable is to demonize her and view her as
less than human. This is interesting because my discussion of the unforgivable had
primarily focused on how the collective injuries dehumanize the victims, but not the
offenders. The demonization of the offenders poses interesting questions about whether
or not additional harms would be inflicted on the offenders. "For to respect [the
offenders] qua human is to refuse to reduce them to their wrong-doing and to hold open

Griswold, Forgiveness, 93.
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'their capacity for reflection and transformation.'"

Of course, the possible

demonization is applicable to all instances of forgiveness, and such harms are
incomparable to the dehumanization for the unforgivable collective injuries. That is, the
concern of such demonization pales in comparison to the unforgivable injuries, especially
because the victims would not be able to retaliate against their offenders in turn. Their
suffering is unforgivable because they cannot reciprocate against their offenders.
Although this paper is primarily focused on the victims' role in forgiveness, this is clearly
an important concern for this discussion. Initially it appears that demonizing offenders
could be, at least in part, the cause of the injuries being unforgivable.
The notions of the unforgivable are furthered by Jacques Derrida, who argues that
"forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable. One cannot, or should not, forgive; there is
only forgiveness, if there is any, where there is the unforgivable."56 According to
Derrida, the unforgivable are the highest examples of what forgiveness hopes to achieve,
yet is inherently impossible. Derrida's inherent contradiction of forgiveness and the
unforgivable is only worth noting to show the difficulties amongst the different
interpretations of collective injuries, because it illustrates the complications of such
discussions. Continuing with our topic, it is important to note the role of agency in the
unforgivable. In order to forgive, an individual agent must forswear revenge. For
example, a survivor of the Holocaust may forgive the Nazis to cope with the memory of
her sufferings. And yet, the Holocaust is undoubtedly an absolute and radical evil that is
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unforgivable,

because it cannot be punished, let alone by an individual. Such an

individual agent lacks the moral authority to forgive on behalf of all survivors.
If the unforgivable involves collectives, then there is the difficulty of constructing
an adequate notion of collective agency to allow for collective forgiveness. More
importantly, however, is that the unforgivable, as radical evil undermines the very
possibility for agency. For example, Kant's use of radical evil presupposed human will
and that there are comprehensible motives that can explain radical evil. But this is
precisely what Arendt is calling into question: "we actually have nothing to fall back on
in order to understand a phenomenon that nevertheless confronts us with its
overpowering reality.'"58 Arendt understands radical evil as the attack against humanity,
which in turns undermines morality. An attack on humanity and morality cannot be
countered with the humanist morality of forgiveness, because these are the very features
being destroyed by radical evil. Radical evil represents the unforgivable, because of its
superfluousness: "To make human beings superfluous is to eradicate the very conditions
that make humanity possible: ... Mass murder, genocide, unbearable large-scale suffering
by innocent people, systematic torture and terror."59 Radical evil necessarily deals with
collectives, so there is collective unforgivable.
Similar to forgiveness, the unforgivable requires resentment. However, such
resentment is not a necessary condition, as it is in forgiveness. Instead, resentment is an
unavoidable result of the collectively unforgivable injuries:
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If the offenders are not forgivable, [then] the injured should let go of as much
anger as possible for other reasons, including peace of mind. Nonetheless it
would be true that a person who is in principle unforgivable warrants resentment
forever. Similarly, it would also be a mistake to hold that, given the frequency
with which humans have treated each other cruelly and brutally, the thesis that
such behavior is unforgivable 'offers a blueprint for lasting hatred ongoing
conflict, and sagas of revenge.'60
The unforgivable does not serve a purpose, since it does not strive for any particular ends,
although care must be taken, because of the propensity for the unforgivable to be
dehumanizing. Furthermore, "the magnitude of the wrong done generates doubt that
anything could ever 'make up for' a truly atrocious wrong whose effects on you are
permanent. The doubts are not dispelled by the argument that acknowledgement of our
humanity is sufficient reason for forgiveness." ' Radical evil undermines the agency and
humanity of its victims, and thus the shared humanity of the victimized and offending
collectives is not sufficient for forgiveness.
Radical evil and the unforgivable dehumanize its victims, but the victims must
still be capable of resentment: "The issue of 'unforgivability' arises with respect to levels
of evil that elicit resentment so deep as to be accompanied by rage; indeed outrage."62
Similar to the forms of forgiveness previously discussed, resentment remains consistent
in the unforgivable. The resentment cannot dissipate, because forgiveness can never be
achieved. If anything, the presence of resentment is a necessary condition for the
unforgivable.
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But if resentment is a necessary condition for the unforgivable, then African
Americans would be required to be resentful for the unforgivable history of slavery and
discrimination. However, they have not sought retaliation on the same scale of the
injustices they have suffered, and are not nearly as resentful as such a requirement would
seem to necessitate. But this does not mean that they have forgiven themselves, the
European slave traders, American slave owners, and nearly everyone else that has been in
some way culpable for their sufferings. The crimes are unforgiven, but only because they
are quantifiably unforgivable. But even here there is the problem that the unforgiven
implies the possibility of forgiveness, whereas the unforgivable excludes such
possibilities. The legacy of American segregation and discrimination could be
interpreted as unforgivable, because of the collective nature of the crimes, and the
difficulty of achieving an appropriate forgiveness for such collective injuries.
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CONCLUSION

My discussion has been admittedly brief, and does not presuppose to offer an
encompassing account of forgiveness. However, the definitions of forgiveness that I
have laid out can be transferred from individuals to collectives. The inherent difficulties
of collective forgiveness often result in the crimes remaining unforgiven, but this does
not constitute the unforgivable. To understand the unforgivable, I have distinguished
offenses from the offenders. Although it would be a mistake to interpret all crimes as
unforgivable, just as all offenders are not immune to unforgivability, the agent must be
separate from her actions. Collectives, on the other hand, may be defined as a group
because of their collective acts, and thus be inseparably tied to their unforgivable crimes.
While some individuals within such unforgivable collectives may be forgiven in spite of
the associations with the group, figureheads of the group are likewise inseparable from
the collective and its crimes. Although the distinction between an agent and its deeds
may seem unintuitive, it is equally unsettling to think of the collective injuries cataloged
by Tutu in the introductory quotation as forgivable. Indeed, such atrocities demand that
they are unforgivable. Although my arguments may not be the most eloquent, I hope to
have provided an understanding of forgiveness that allows for such crimes to remain
beyond the possibility of forgiveness.
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